Safety Critical Controls

Identification of Safety Critical Controls (SCC) is critical to the process of demonstrating that risk to personnel is As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP).

The management of SCCs comprises of the following:

  • Identification of Major Accident Hazard (MAHs) events
  • Selection of Safety Critical Controls(SCCs)

Methodology

SCC are defined as:

“Parts of an installation and such of its structures, plant equipment and systems (including computer programmes) or any part thereof, the failure of which could cause or contribute substantially to; or a purpose of which is to prevent or limit the effect of a major accident or any accident with severe or catastrophic consequences.”

A structured, methodical approach must be undertaken to identify SCC.  It must address each MAH event in turn and specifically list each of the SCC associated with that particular hazard.  The cross referencing of hazards to the particular SCC is important as it focuses attention onto their purpose and importance.

SCC are taken from the Barriers, Escalation Factors, Controls and Preparedness Measures in the Bowtie diagrams.

Examples of SCC include but are not limited to:

  • Critical structures whose failure could lead to a multiple fatality accident, such as offshore platform jackets and accommodation unit topside support structures
  • Equipment where loss of integrity could result in an escape of fluid under pressure or hazardous material with the potential to cause harm to people or the environment
  • Structures supporting equipment where loss of integrity could result in an escape of hazardous material with the potential to cause fatality or damage to the environment
  • Integrity protection systems such as relief valves, instrumented protective systems and restriction orifices that protect the plant from loss of containment as a result of exceeding design conditions
  • Detection equipment and systems designed to alert the operators of an escape of hazardous material and possibly to initiate various control actions
  • Release control equipment and systems such as emergency shutdown, non-return valves and blowdown, which are designed to limit the quantity of hazardous material involved in an incident
  • Secondary containment equipment and systems designed to restrict hazardous materials spreading from a spillage location into other areas
  • Fire and explosion suppression equipment and systems where people could otherwise be at risk
  • Fire fighting equipment and systems
  • Incident control equipment such as water sprays, foam systems and search and rescue equipment

The register of identified SCC will be listed in the COMAH Report and is the foundation for development of the integrity assurance scheme.

Safety Critical Controls

Identification of Safety Critical Controls (SCC) is critical to the process of demonstrating that risk to personnel is As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP).

The management of SCCs comprises of the following:

  • Identification of Major Accident Hazard (MAHs) events
  • Selection of Safety Critical Controls(SCCs)

Methodology

SCC are defined as:

“Parts of an installation and such of its structures, plant equipment and systems (including computer programmes) or any part thereof, the failure of which could cause or contribute substantially to; or a purpose of which is to prevent or limit the effect of a major accident or any accident with severe or catastrophic consequences.”

A structured, methodical approach must be undertaken to identify SCC.  It must address each MAH event in turn and specifically list each of the SCC associated with that particular hazard.  The cross referencing of hazards to the particular SCC is important as it focuses attention onto their purpose and importance.

SCC are taken from the Barriers, Escalation Factors, Controls and Preparedness Measures in the Bowtie diagrams.

Examples of SCC include but are not limited to:

  • Critical structures whose failure could lead to a multiple fatality accident, such as offshore platform jackets and accommodation unit topside support structures
  • Equipment where loss of integrity could result in an escape of fluid under pressure or hazardous material with the potential to cause harm to people or the environment
  • Structures supporting equipment where loss of integrity could result in an escape of hazardous material with the potential to cause fatality or damage to the environment
  • Integrity protection systems such as relief valves, instrumented protective systems and restriction orifices that protect the plant from loss of containment as a result of exceeding design conditions
  • Detection equipment and systems designed to alert the operators of an escape of hazardous material and possibly to initiate various control actions
  • Release control equipment and systems such as emergency shutdown, non-return valves and blowdown, which are designed to limit the quantity of hazardous material involved in an incident
  • Secondary containment equipment and systems designed to restrict hazardous materials spreading from a spillage location into other areas
  • Fire and explosion suppression equipment and systems where people could otherwise be at risk
  • Fire fighting equipment and systems
  • Incident control equipment such as water sprays, foam systems and search and rescue equipment

The register of identified SCC will be listed in the COMAH Report and is the foundation for development of the integrity assurance scheme.